Peace, Security and Deterrence in Classical Greece by Crowley, JP
Crowley, JP (2020) Peace, Security and Deterrence in Classical Greece. In:












A modern reader might be forgiven for thinking that the Greeks and their neighbours 
were addicted to war. Their histories, and indeed much of their other literature, revolves 
around conflict, and yet, the impression is misleading: they greatly appreciated peace, and the 
distressing ubiquity of war is less the result of human choice, and more a reflection of harsh 
geo-political necessity. 
 
1.1. The Possibility of Peace 
 
The Greeks valued peace. In Euripides’ Suppliant Women (488-93; cf. 778-85: trans. 
Coleridge, adapted), the Theban herald describes peace as ‘the Muses’ dearest friend’ and the 
‘enemy of Sorrow’. He goes on to exclaim ‘how much better peace is for mankind than war’, 
a proposition he justifies by association with concrete ‘blessings’, namely the ‘glad throngs of 
children’ and ‘delight in prosperity.’ Other evidence corroborates this view. A proverb in 
Plutarch’s Life of Nicias (9.5; cf. Polybius 12.26.1), contrasts peace, when men wake to the 
sound of the cock crowing, with war, when they are roused by the raucous sound of the 
salpinx. Aristophanes, naturally, goes further: the endings of his ‘peace plays’ Lysistrata, 
Peace and Acharnians associate peace with even more fundamental aspects of the good life, 
namely eating, drinking and sex. 
 War, conversely, was feared. Herodotus (1.87.4: trans Godley) has Croesus lament 
how ‘foolish’ it is to ‘choose war over peace. In peace sons bury their fathers, in war fathers 
bury their sons.’ Similarly, Thucydides has the Athenian statesman Pericles declare (2.61.1: 
trans. Crawley) during the Peloponnesian War that an unnecessary fight is ‘the greatest of 
follies’. Even more strikingly, as that war escalated, he made the Syracusan, Hermocrates, not 
only proclaim (4.59.2) that ‘war is an evil’, but also that this ‘proposition’ was so normative 
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‘it would be tedious to develop it.’ However, if the Greeks valued peace and feared war, why 
did they so readily engage in armed conflict? 
 
1.2. The Certainty of War 
 
The ubiquity of war is explained by three mutually-reinforcing factors. The first is a 
geo-political environment characterised by cultural unity and political fragmentation. 
According to Herodotus (8.144.2), the Greeks felt a common kinship, yet, their panhellenic 
sentiment was undercut by a more immediate attachment to their individual city-states 
(poleis), a feeling forcefully expressed in Pericles’ funeral oration, delivered during the first 
year of the Peloponnesian War. This speech, reported, or perhaps recreated, by Thucydides 
(2.35-46), celebrates the patriotic zeal of the Athenians, especially its highest manifestation: 
the willingness to fight to the death for Athens (Crowley 2012; Loraux 2006).  
The Greeks, then, were subject to the competing demands of panhellenism and polis 
particularism, but the strength of these forces was by no means equal, as their response to 
Xerxes’ invasion reveals (Lazenby 1993; Mitchell 2007). This is often imagined as the 
Greeks’ finest hour, during which they collectively defeated an overwhelming Persian force, 
but the truth is that the Greeks did not unite, they looked instead to their own interests. Some, 
like Argos (Hdt. 7.148.1-153.3) stayed neutral, others, such as Thebes, sided with the 
Persians (7.132.1, 157.1-63.2, 205.2-206.1, 233.1-2, 9.2, 40.1), and a very small minority, 
only thirty-one, formed the Hellenic League and resisted (Lazenby 1993). Worse still, the 
Hellenic League was so infected by polis particularism that its collective aims were 
continually undermined by its leading states. Sparta, for instance, was willing to sacrifice all 
the northern and central Greek poleis, including Athens, as long as she herself was safe in the 
Peloponnese, whilst the Athenians threatened repeatedly to leave the League unless coalition 
forces were committed north of the isthmus of Corinth (Hdt. 8.60.1-62.1; Lazenby 1993). The 
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Greeks might, therefore, have shared a common identity, but this identity was much weaker 
than the attachment they felt for their individual poleis.   
 The second factor was their inability to regulate interstate relations. In theory, 
regulation was provided by a widely accepted set of norms and values underpinned by a 
sophisticated legal framework and advanced mechanisms for conflict resolution (such as 
interstate arbitration: Thuc. 5.79.1, also 5.18.4, 79.4; Sheets 1994: 51-73). Such measures 
reveal a desire to control inter-communal competition, but they failed largely because they 
could not be enforced (Low 2007: 77-128; cf. Thuc. 5.89.1). Greek poleis, consequently, 
formed a horizontal community of states in which the only vertical authority was provided by 
the gods (Low 2007: 118-26; Hunt 2010: 215-36).  
Diplomacy, as a result, was conducted under the purview of the divine (heralds, for 
instance, were protected by Hermes: Hdt. 7.133.1-6.2) and interstate treaties were guaranteed 
by oaths sworn to the gods. These oaths exerted considerable force, since breaking one 
incurred not just divine wrath, it also risked the gods joining with the wronged party to 
punish the oath-breaker (Xen. Hell. 3.4.11, 5.4.1; Hall 2007: 85-107; Low 2007: 118-26; 
Raaflaub 2016: 122-57). Avoiding this through interstate arbitration, an obligation enshrined 
in many Greek treaties was, therefore, compelling (see esp. Thuc. 1.78.4, 85.2, 140.2, 2.2.1-
7.1 7.18.1-4). Nevertheless, even if an acceptable arbitrator could be found in the polarised 
geo-political context of Classical Greece, there was little possibility of forcing any major 
Greek power to accept an offer of arbitration or of enforcing a subsequent judgement. 
Consequently, any Greek polis which felt its aims could be more effectively obtained through 
war could refuse an offer of arbitration and abrogate their treaty obligations, and when they 




 These two factors, furthermore, resulted in a third, namely the way the Greeks felt 
about war and the warrior. Understandably, given their unstable environment, the Greeks 
came to accept war as a natural way for a state to resolve disputes and advance or defend its 
interests (Thuc. 1.76.1-4, 2.64.2-6; Xen. Cav. 8.7, Mem. 2.1.28). Moreover, since it was men 
who fought these wars, the Greeks’ concept of masculinity became as militarised as the geo-
political environment in which they lived (Crowley 2012: 80-104).  
Of course, with the exception of the Spartans and serving mercenaries, the Greeks 
were amateur warriors (Xen. Mem. 3.12.5, Ways. 4.52; cf. Thuc. 5.66.2-4; Xen. Lak. Pol. 
11.4; Trundle 2004), and so their concept of masculinity was not entirely martial (Lys. 7.40-
1; Xen. Ec. 4.1-25; cf. Thuc. 1.5.1-6.6; Roisman 2005: 26-63). Nevertheless, the Greeks felt 
that the greatest quality a man could demonstrate, and the one thing that undoubtedly defined 
him as a man, was his ability to overcome his fear and fight in interpersonal combat (Soph. 
Ant. 640-81; Thuc. 2.42.3; Crowley 2012: 92-6). Naturally, since the Greeks valued words 
less than deeds, this ability could not be declared, it had to be demonstrated (Xen. Symp. 
8.43), and this ensured that men, especially young men, felt the need to prove themselves in 
combat (Crowley 2012: 86-88; Hunt 2010: 51-71, 108-33). Consequently, when interstate 
disputes escalated, it was easier for men to vote for war, since this confirmed their courage, 
and harder to vote for peace, because that called their courage into question and exposed 




The Greeks then, were politically fragmented, they lacked an enforceable system of 
international law, and faced by endless conflict, they normalised war and privileged the role 
of the warrior. Nevertheless, they were not helpless, and while they could not avoid the 
danger of war, they developed a range of sophisticated strategies designed to minimise the 





Some poleis pursued a policy of neutrality, hoping to avoid the wars of others, but, as 
Bauslaugh (1990) demonstrates, this strategy entailed significant risks. The concept of 
neutrality was, for the Greeks, not just indistinct, but also contentious and contested. 
Consequently, poleis wishing to remain neutral had to perform a precarious balancing act, 
seeking philia (friendship, see Mitchell 1997: 28-44, also Hall 2007: 85-107) with potential 
belligerents whilst avoiding entangling obligations. Non-alignment, however, could easily 
become isolation, as Corcyra discovered immediately prior to the Peloponnesian War, when 
she found herself alone, threatened by Corinth, with no allies to come to her aid (Thuc. 
1.31.1-32.5). Moreover, this risk was exacerbated by the suspicion neutrality attracted: the 
action-orientated Greeks tend to associate neutrality with selfishness and cowardice, and 
since belligerents often considered conflict a zero sum game, neutrality could easily be 
construed as aiding the enemy (Bauslaugh 1990: 70-83, also Hall 2007: 85-107). The 
Athenians, for instance, took this view of Melian neutrality during the Peloponnesian War. 
As Thucydides describes (5.84.1-116.4), they demanded Melos side with them against the 
Spartans, and when she refused, they violated her neutrality, crushed her militarily, executed 
her men and andrapodised her surviving populace.  
Neutrality, then, was fragile, and evidence of success is scant. This may, as Bauslaugh 
observes (1990: 21-35), simply reflect the nature of the extant evidence which makes 
neutrality most visible only at the point of failure. Argos, admittedly a relatively powerful 
polis, was able remain neutral during some of conflicts that marred the 5th and 4th Centuries  
(Hdt. 7.148.1-15.3; Thuc. 5.14.4; Bauslaugh 1990: 91-9, 109-41, 197-241). Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that neutrality, for the powerful, was a position they violated or upheld as it 
suited, whereas, for the weak, it was a risky strategy that entailed isolation and the placement 





The alternative, for weaker states, especially those in close proximity to more 
powerful neighbours was, to use the terminology of Walt (1987), to bandwagon. This 
involved trading some or all external freedom (eleuthereria) for guarantees of external 
security and internal sovereignty (autonomia), an exchange which allowed powerful poleis to 
establish themselves as hegemons (Thuc. 1.8.3, 15.2; Karavites 1982: 145-62; Hall 2010: 72-
107; Hunt 2010: 154-84). After the Persian Wars, for instance, many Greek states 
collectivised their security under the leadership of Athens in order to protect themselves from 
Persia (Thuc. 1.89.1-118.3). Hegemonies, however, exist for the benefit of hegemons, and 
whilst subject states might sometimes manipulate them for their own interests (see esp. Thuc. 
1.67.1-88.1), their initial sacrifice of eleutheria might lead to further loss of autonomia. 
Democratic Athens, for example, seems to have encouraged and sometimes imposed 
democracies on allies (Ps. Xen. Ath. Pol. 3.10-11; ML 40; Thuc. 1.115.3), and oligarchic 
Sparta acted similarly amongst those poleis she enrolled in the Peloponnesian League, which 
she controlled, in part, by supporting their own oligarchic regimes (Thuc. 1.19.1, 67.1-86.5, 
144.2).  
Even these profound compromises, however, did not necessarily entail escape from 
war, since dependents were often led into wars aimed squarely at their hegemon’s 
aggrandizement. For instance, during the First Peloponnesian War (461-446 BC: Thuc. 
1.102.1-115.1), Athens not only led her allies into battle in order to establish a land empire in 
central Greece, she also led them to disaster in North Africa during the Egyptian expedition 




Neutrality and subordination, then, guaranteed neither peace nor security, and it is 
unsurprising that Greek states sought to maintain their own capacity for defence. As Gomme 
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and Grundy recognised (1945: 10-24; 1911: 240-52), a glance at a map suggests that, for 
some states, the terrain itself, augmented with judicious use of fortifications, could have been 
used to deny hostile forces access to friendly territory. This potential, of course, had been 
actualised by the Greeks during the Persian Wars, when they used the pass at Thermopylae 
and its rudimentary fortifications to good effect against the invading Persians in 480 BC (Hdt. 
7.176.2-5, 208.2, 223.2, 225.1-3; cf, 7.139-1-6, 207.1, 8.40.1-2, 71.1-2).  
The failure to hold the pass, however, highlights one of the three obvious problems 
with preclusive defence, and that is the fact that no matter how strong a strongpoint is, or how 
challenging the terrain in which it is located, a determined invader can usually find a way 
around it (Hdt. 7.213.1-18.3). The second problem is even worse: manmade or natural 
obstacles are only obstacles as long as they are defended. An effective system of preclusive 
defence, therefore, requires a standing military force as well as the logistical systems required 
to support it, and both were beyond the modest resources of the Greeks (Gomme 1945: 10-
24; Krentz 2007: 147-85).  Finally, even if a system of preclusive defence could be manned 
and supported, there was no way of avoiding the third problem inherent thereto, namely, any 
state that adopted it placed all or most of its strength at its extremities. This entails such a 
dangerous degree of dispersal that a numerically inferior enemy could attain relative 
superiority by concentrating its forces at given location, and by breaching the defences at that 
point, render the entire system useless (see esp. McRaven 1995, also Luttwak 1976). 
 These problems, moreover, could be avoided by allowing a hostile force to violate the 
integrity of friendly territory, a temporary concession which allowed a state to concentrate all 
available forces against an invading army in the hope of defeating it in one decisive 
engagement (Hanson 2000). This strategy also avoided the costs of building, supplying and 
garrisoning static defences, it allowed the men of the polis to remain economically productive 
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and politically engaged, and it was still an effective security solution, because the Greeks 
were able to mobilise and deploy impressive field armies.  
 Typically, such armies formed around a core of heavy infantrymen the Greeks called 
hoplites. These warriors took their name from the Greek word for kit (hopla: Lazenby and 
Whitehead 1996: 27-33), and a full set of kit (a panoply) included a large round shield with a 
double grip, body armour, helmet and greaves for protection, a large thrusting spear as a 
primary weapon, and a short sword for backup (Hanson 1991: 63-84). Naturally, the weight 
of this entailed a substantial loss of tactical mobility offset by the adoption of a close-order 
rank and file formation called a phalanx (Schwartz: 2009). Often eight deep, this formation 
presented the enemy with a shield wall and an intimidating line of spear points, and although 
it was strong when engaged head-on, it was vulnerable to attack from flank or rear (Crowley 
2012: 49-66). Accordingly, these vulnerabilities, where possible, were protected by terrain 
and the deployment of subordinate forces such as cavalry and light infantry (see esp. the 
battles of Delium in 424 BC, and Mantineia in 418 BC: Thuc. 4.89.1-101.1, 5.66.1–74.3).  
A phalanx, moreover, required only a moderate financial investment. Leaving aside 
the Spartans, whose professionalism was anomalous, hoplites purchased their own equipment 
and provided their own rations (Aristoph. Ach. 197, 1073-1142, Peace 311-2, 1181-2, Wasps 
243; Hanson 1991: 15-37; cf. Thuc. 1.48.1), and if these were sometimes augmented by 
expenses provided by their state, the rate provided was modest and more than offset by the 
savings offered by a main force that required little or no training (see esp. Crowley 2012: 2-3, 
25-6, 34, 50, 64, 70, 81, 117, 123-4). This seems, at first, counter-intuitive. Many scholars 
believe the Greeks’ ability to form up into large phalanxes required extensive tactical training 
(Hunt 2007: 108-46; Pritchett 1974: 208-31; van Wees 2007: 273-99). This belief is bolstered 
by the Spartans, whose hoplites were highly trained (see esp. Aristot. Pol. 8.1338b; Plat. 
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Lach. 182e-183a; Thuc. 2.39.1-4; Xen. Lak. Pol. 7.1-6, 11.1-8) and could, consequently, 
perform more sophisticated tactical manoeuvres than those troops fielded by other states.  
This assumption is, however, false, for three reasons. Firstly, Xenophon states 
explicitly (Mem. 3.12.5, Ways. 4.52; Crowley 2012: 49-66) that, until the end of the classical 
period, even impressive Athenian hoplites received no training whatsoever. Secondly, it is 
dangerous to assume that Spartan hoplites were highly trained: the agōgē (described in Xen. 
Lak. Pol. 2.1-4.7) was aimed at social conditioning (Ducat 2006; Hodkinson 2006: 111-62), 
and whilst it clearly included tactical instruction (cf. Xen. Mem. 3.5.15, 12.5), Spartan 
manoeuvres (Xen. Lak. Pol. 11.5-10) were only sophisticated in comparison to those of the 
other Greeks, which suggests that instruction was limited. Thirdly, whilst drill and training 
does provide men with the ability to adopt large formations efficiently, the Greeks were able 
to achieve this without either. As Xenophon reveals (Cyrop. 2.2.6-9, 3.21, also Asclep. Tact. 
2.4-5; Thuc. 5.68.3; Xen. Lak. Pol. 11.4-10), the only thing a hoplite had to do was follow the 
man in front. In this way, files of men could deploy side by side to form small subunits 
(sometimes called lochoi), which together form intermediate sized units (sometimes called 
taxeis), from which the phalanx as a whole is constructed. With these three levels of tactical 
subdivision, all based on files of men, all following the man in front, the Greeks were able to 
deploy their hoplites into column of route, march into proximity with the enemy and then 
redeploy into line of battle (see esp. Crowley 2012: 49-66). Furthermore, they were able to do 
this with only the direction of unit commanders, many of who, as members of the elite, could 
have purchased their own training from hoplomachoi (military sophists: Xen. Mem. 3.1.9; 
Wheeler 1982: 223-33), but most likely learned what to do through years of practical 
experience (cf. Thuc. 6.72.3, also 1.18.3, 6.91.2, 7.61, 63, 76.4; cf. § 6.69.1, 80.1-2). 
 Such a force, in the event of a serious threat, could deploy pandēmei (with all 
available men: Hdt. 1.62.3; Lys. 3.45; Thuc. 2.31.1, 4.42.3; Xen. Hell. 2.2.7) or, to meet more 
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limited threats it could be mobilised by age groups (as at Sparta: Xen. Hell. 5.4.13, 6.4.17, 
Lak. Pol. 11.2) or katalogos (Aristoph. Peace 1172-85; Thuc. 6.26.2). This method, 
employed by Athens and other poleis (Syracuse for example: Plut. Nic. 14.5), involved the 
handpicking of men by their commanders (a katalogos is a list), and whilst it was slow and 
cumbersome, it enabled a state with an amateur army to mobilise a high quality force 
containing a high proportion of experienced veterans (Crowley 2012: 22-39). 
 They, as discussed, did not fight alone, but were generally supported by light infantry 
and cavalry. In an emergency, those too poor to afford the two indispensable items of the 
panoply, namely the shield and spear, could serve as light infantry, but because that role 
required proficiency in weapons and tactics, ad hoc bodies of light infantry were of 
questionable worth (Pritchett 1991: 65-7; van Wees 2004: 61-5, 68-71). Consequently, poleis 
often hired small contingents of professionals: Thrace, for instance, supplied peltasts (javelin-
throwing skirmishers), Rhodes was famous for its slingers and Crete for its archers (Thuc. 
6.43.1-2, 7.27.1-30.3; Xen. Anab. 3.3.16; Best 1969). 
 Cavalry service was even more demanding: cavalrymen not only required proficiency 
with weapons (especially the javelin: Xen. Anab. 3.2.18, Cav. 1.21, Horse. 12.11-13), they 
also had to deploy those weapons from a horse, as well as operate at speed and in formation 
(Xen. Cav. 1.1-9.9, Horse 1.1-12.14; Hyland 2013: 512-26). Consequently, effective cavalry 
forces required a degree of competency which the Athenians, for instance, attained, through 
state oversight of and financial support for a small cadre of semi-professionals recruited from 
the horse-owning elite (Bugh 1988; Worley 1994: 70-4, 77-80).  
 Despite this focus on field armies, however, there was still a role for fortifications. 
Poleis were usually protected by walls, behind which non-combatants could shelter in the 
event of an invasion (Thuc. 1.5.1, 8.3, 2.5.1-5, 4.104.1-06.4; Laurence 1979; Winter 1971). 
Some poleis, such as Athens and Megara, augmented these defences with makra teixē (Thuc. 
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1.103.4, 107.1, 108.3), ‘long walls’ that protected a corridor connecting the fortified urban 
centre with the sea. These walls offered significant advantages, especially in Greece, where 
siege warfare remained under-developed. The reasons for this are cultural and technical: the 
Greeks lacked torsion-based artillery and could not defeat enemy walls from a distance, and 
while they possessed other close-range means of breaching, overtopping and scaling, 
employing them to assault fortifications was bloody work suited to expendable troops, not 
citizen warriors (Laurence 1979: 36-66; Krentz 2007: 147-85; Marsden 1969: 5-173; Seaman 
2013: 642-56). 
 Accordingly, whilst attempts to defeat fortifications were not unknown (for example 
during the siege of Plataea, 429-27 BC: Thuc. 2.71.1-78.4, 3.20.1-24.3, 52.1-68.5), the 
Greeks tend to rely on circumvallation, that is, encircling their target with a siege wall and 
letting time and starvation do their grisly work (Thuc. 2.78.1, 3.52.1). Long walls, however, 
were an effective counter-measure, because they allowed a state that was cut off from its own 
agricultural land to obtain supplies by sea (Thuc. 1.143.3-5, 2.13.1-9, 22.1-24.1, 55.2, 60.1-
65.13), and this could prevented only if the attacker went to the additional expense of 
imposing a naval blockade (Thuc. 6.75.1-7.16.2, 21.1-26.3, 31.1-33.6, 35.1-72.4).  
Credible armed forces and strong fortifications (Aristot. Pol. 7.1330b-31a; Dem. 
14.11), however, only partly satisfied a state’s security needs, and most sought additional 
protection through alliances with others. At the most basic level, poleis formalised reciprocal 
friendship with other states through open-ended philia agreements (Bauslaugh 1990: 36-69; 
Mitchel 1997: 28-44), but since this provided little positive benefit in the event of conflict, 
they sought alliances that included more concrete obligations. According to Thucydides, 
(1.44.1, 5.48.2), there were two distinct types of alliance: an epimachia was a defensive 
alliance which only required contracting parties to come to one another’s defence if they were 
attacked by a third, whereas a symmachia was a full defensive and offensive alliance which 
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required the contracting parties to ‘have the same friends and enemies’. Actual practice, 
however, blurred this distinction, but, leaving aside aggressive operations, both types of 
treaty provided participants with a means of increasing their aggregate power, since once 
activated, all parties were obligated to provide military assistance to any ally under threat (see 
esp. IG II2 43, the ‘charter’ of the Second Athenian League, with Adcock and Mosley 1975: 
71-78; Hunt 2010: 104-5).  
Such obligations, naturally, were not always faithfully discharged. When faced with 
the prospect of war, some states offered excuses and avoided their obligations (for examples, 
see esp. Bauslaugh 1990: 166-96), but such transgressions came with penalties. It was 
difficult, admittedly, for the Greeks to compel a state to honour its obligations, but, because 
interstate relations were governed by reciprocity, any state that failed to aid its allies might 
well find itself left in the lurch when those same allies reciprocated in kind (Hunt 2010: 72-
107, 185-214; van Wees 1998: 13-49, 2004: 3-18). Alliances, then, were taken seriously by 




 The Greeks, then, had various means to enhance their security. Some states remained 
neutral, but the suspicion and isolation this entailed left them vulnerable. Others surrendered 
a degree of freedom in order to avoid the aggression of more powerful neighbours and obtain 
their protection. Those, however, with a realistic chance of maintaining their independence, 
placed their faith in credible armed forces, fortifications, strong allies, and a good reputation, 
and the way a state used these resources to respond to the aggression of another could also 
deter future aggression.  
As Hunt observes (2010: 108-33, 185-214), a weak response to aggression encourages 
further aggression, whereas a forceful response reduces the likelihood of further attacks. This 
situation encouraged small states to fight back against larger opponents (see, for example, 
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Thuc. 2.71.1-78.4, 3.20.1-24.3, 52.1-68.5), but a polis could also deter aggression by 
exploiting its military victories to the fullest extent possible. Accordingly, the Greeks pursued 
beaten enemies mercilessly and those unable to evade risked massacre (Hdt. 6.78.1-81.1; 
Thuc. 3.94.1-98.5, 4.96.6-8, 7.73.1-85.4; van Wees 2006: 69-110), not simply because this 
served to deter future aggression from others, but also because a severely damaged rival lost 
not just the will but also the capacity for further aggression. 
Of course, the poleis of Greece did not simply adopt a strategic posture and then 
passively await the evolution of events, they also tried to pre-empt aggression by engaging in 
a constant process of positioning to ensure that they were best placed to meet existing or 
emerging threats. As previously discussed, some states bandwagoned with emerging threats, 
but those who could tended to balance (for which see Walt 1987), that is, ally themselves 
with other states to counter-balance the threat. For example, the rise of Athens after the 
Persian Wars was opposed by Sparta and Thebes, the rise of Sparta after the Peloponnesian 
War was opposed by Athens and Thebes, and the rise of Thebes after the Corinthian War was 
opposed by Athens and Sparta (Hunt 2010: 154-84; Strauss 1991: 189-210). Greece, then, 
was a self-balancing system, in which no one state could become predominant, and whilst 
this did not reduce the prevalence of conflict, it did allow the Greek poleis to maintain their 
independence. 
 
4. The Hellenistic World 
 This independence, however, came at a price. An acephalous collection of micro-
states was, by its very nature, vulnerable to more unified external threats. The Greeks’ 
resistance to Persia was so undermined by particularism that they avoided subordination by 
the narrowest of margins (Hdt. 8.60.1-62.1; Lazenby 1993), and famously, their response to 
the rise of Macedon was even worse. Philip isolated his opponents with a mixture of threats 
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and promises, and although a coalition was eventually formed against him, it was too little, 
too late. As a result, the Greeks’ endless internecine struggles ended in crushing military 
defeat at Chaeronea in 338 BC (Diod. Sic. 16.85.1-86.6), after which matters of peace, 
security and deterrence were determined by the overarching authority of Philip of Macedon, 
and those who came after.     
 Alexander’s conquest of the Persian empire and premature death created a geo-
political environment radically different from that which came before. This vast expanse was 
partitioned between Alexander’s senior commanders, who are often referred to as the 
Diadochi, the Successors, and the super-states that emerged from their competition operated 
on a distinct dynamic determined by their political evolution. This produced kings whose 
legitimacy rested primarily upon military success , and whilst a common Macedonian 
identity, dynastic intermarriage, and incessant diplomacy went some way towards 
ameliorating conflict, the Hellenistic kings had to fight in order to survive (see Polyb. 15.20; 
Plut. Pyrr. 14.1-8, with Billows 2007: 303-24; Chaniotis 2005: 57-77; Serrati 2007: 461-97). 
  To do this, the Hellenistic super-states were able to draw on economic resources far 
beyond those of the traditional Greek powers. Macedonia, of course, was by no means poor, 
and the conquest of the East provided access to the wealth of Asia as well as agricultural land 
that could be tithed or settled in exchange for military service (Serrati 2007: 461-97). As a 
result, the military forces deployed by the Hellenistic monarchs were simply unparalleled 
(see esp. Sekunda and de Souza 2007: 325-67). On land, they were able to rely on huge 
armies whose ability to project power was derived not just from their size but also their 
enhanced professionalism (Roth 2007: 368-98): at the battle of Raphia (217 BC), for 
instance, around 140, 000 men took the field (Polyb. 5.79.1-13). Hellenistic navies were 
similarly impressive. As the fleet deployed by Demetrius I Poliorcetes at Salamis in 306 BC 
reveals (Diod. Sic. 20.49-50), ships were bigger, carried more fighting men and in many 
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cases deployed artillery for use against other ships and coastal defences (Sekunda and de 
Souza 2007: 357-67). The advances in artillery which made this possible, particularly the 
widespread adoption of the torsion spring, also provided the Hellenistic monarchs with an 
unprecedented ability to attack and take fortified positions (see, for instance, Polyb. 5.99.7, 
with Roth 2007: 368-98; Sabin and de Souza 2007: 448-60).  
Against such power, the poleis of Greece could do little. Some, like the twelve states 
of Achaea in the Peloponnese, were able to pool their sovereignty, and through the revival of 
the Achaean League, seek a degree of independence (Roy 2003: 81-95). Most, however, 
accepted their irreversibly changed circumstances and sought security through subordination. 
Naturally, for the Greeks, given both their history and their culture, this was particularly 
unpalatable, and they sought to mask their subordination by recasting their successive 
Macedonian overlords as benefactors whose generosity they celebrated and honoured 
(Billows 2007: 303-24). This, of course, did nothing to change the reality of the relationship: 
the Macedonians eclipsed the power of the Greeks and their old enemies, the Persians, but, of 
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